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Abstract 
Judges may not decide cases as they wish, they are subject to the law they are 
entrusted to apply, a law made by the legislator (a feature of heteronomy). But in 
doing so, they do not take any instruction from any other power or instance (this 
contributes to their independence or autonomy). Sometimes, they apply the law of 
the land taking into account the norms and principles of other, international, 
supranational, even transnational systems. In such cases of conform interpretation, 
again, they perform a delicate balance between autonomy (domestic legal order 
and domestic culture of legal interpretation) and heteronomy (external legal order 
and culture of interpretation). There are common shared aspects of Justice in the 
Member States of the EU, but, this contribution explores some, perhaps the most 
salient, features of Spanish Justice in this wider European context. They are not 
exclusive to Spain, but they way they combine and interact, and their intensity is 
quite uniquely Spanish. These are seven theses about Justice in Spain, which 
combine in unique ways as can be seen in the infamous Garzón case, discussed in 
detail. 
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Judges may not decide cases as they wish, they are subject to the law they are 
entrusted to apply, a law made by the legislator (heteronomy). But in doing so, 
they do not take any instruction from any other power or instance (independence or 
autonomy). Sometimes, they apply the law of the land taking into account the 
norms and principles of other, international, supranational, even transnational 
systems. In such cases, again, they perform a delicate balance between autonomy 
(domestic legal order and domestic culture of legal interpretation) and heteronomy 
(external legal order and culture of interpretation). There are common shared 
aspects of Justice in the Member States of the EU, but, this contribution explores 
some, perhaps the most salient, features of Spanish Justice in this wider European 
context. They are not exclusive to Spain, but they way they combine and interact, 
and their intensity is quite uniquely Spanish. These are seven theses about Justice 
in Spain: 
1. First thesis: Justice in Disrepute 
According to Perfecto Andres Ibañez (personal communication, 25 Mar 2011), judge 
of the Supreme Court, Spanish justice is in an endemic crisis1. In order to illustrate 
a general malaise shared by the members of the Judiciary, by other powers and 
institutions of the State, by the legal profession and by public opinion at large, a 
few examples of a very different nature can be brought to the fore: 
(1) In March 2010, a large number of Spanish judges signed a manifesto urging 
to de-politicise Justice. They were very critical towards the General Council 
for the Judicial Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, hereafter “CGPJ” 
or the “Council”) and the Administration of Justice. The Manifesto was a 
sequel to the so-called 8th October movement, which had organised two 
judicial strikes all over Spain (it was hotly debated, but never settled, 
whether such strike would be unconstitutional). Not often does one find such 
blunt criticism from the judiciary itself. The long list of complaints was most 
critical of the nomination practices at the Council and of the methods to 
nominate its members, but not really self-critical as to members of the 
judiciary, their performance or their relationship with other powers, sectors 
or even other collaborators with the Justice administration. The CGPJ called 
these movements “one of the most striking events of Spanish judicial 
history” (“uno de los acontecimientos más llamativos de la historia judicial 
española”) and admits in its Report for 2010 that Spain is living a crisis of 
trust in Justice, “una crisis de confianza en la Justicia” (p. 11). 
(2) The Catalan political parties in 2010 (including the governing Socialist Party 
of Catalonia PSC, affiliate of the Socialist Party, PSOE), considered that the 
Constitutional Court of the time lacked legitimacy to rule on the Catalan 
Statute and called for its urgent and immediate renewal. It has taken the 
Constitutional Court almost four years (3 years and 11 months) to reach a 
sufficient majority to decide on the Estatut. The new Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy (Estatut) was approved first by the Catalan Parlament, next by 
the Spanish Cortes and then by the Catalan people in referendum 4 years 
ago, and the Estatut has been in application since its approval. The 
mandates of three Constitutional Court judges, including its President, 
expired more than two years ago, another member died2. But the Senate 
was unable to agree on the new candidates on a list submitted by the 
Autonomous Communities (because one candidate proposed by all the 
Autonomous Communities with a Popular Party government received a 
                                                 
1 “Crisis de la Justicia. Una perspectiva desde la judicatura”, Lecture given in Bilbao, 25-March 2011, in 
the seminar “La Justicia y sus problemas: retos y oportunidades”, organised by Margarita Uria (member 
of the CGPJ) and Alberto Saiz (University of the Basque Country). 
2 Roberto García Calvo, a curious character, former provincial civil governor during the Franco 
dictatorship, who had displayed a gun in a traffic incident with a driver who had confronted him. On this 
judge see Calvo, Díaz (2007)  
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negative opinion from the Senate Committee for failure to fulfil the condition 
of 15 years experience as a jurist .... so they let the time lapse in order to 
reach the 15 years). There were many contentious issues in the Estatut 
discussed before the Court, but none as hotly debated as the national status 
of Catalonia i.e. “nación” v “nacionalidad” (and the “national symbols”), and 
the preferential treatment of the Catalan language. Other contentious issues 
were the creation of a Catalan Council of the Judiciary, the detailed 
distribution of competences between Catalonia and the State, and limitations 
on the harmonising competences of the Central level. An interesting fact is 
that similar recent statutes of autonomy with similar clauses but for the 
national status and the language question have not been brought before the 
Court by other Autonomous Communities and have been voted favourably 
by the Group which brought the action in the Catalan case, the Popular 
Party. Some provisions of the Catalan Estatut have finally been found to 
contravene the Constitution in relation to the financial mechanisms and the 
Catalan Council of the Judiciary; other provisions have been declared in 
conformity with the Constitution, insofar as they receive a “constitutionally 
conform” interpretation. But the judgment of the Constitutional Court has 
created a constitutional problem of legitimacy and on who has the last word, 
the pouvoir constituant of the electorate in referendum or the pouvoir 
constitué of the Court3. 
(3) Judge Garzon, the Spanish personality with greatest World notoriety, is 
being tried for “prevarication” in two different cases, i.e. willingly adopting a 
judicial decision known to be wrong or unjust (Article 446-449 of the 
Spanish Criminal Code) and has been provisionally suspended from his office 
at the Juzgado Central 5 in the Audiencia Nacional by the Council (May 
2010) after the Supreme Court, instructed by Judge Varela, decided to try 
him for the criminal charges brought against him by two extreme right-wing 
organisations (Manos Limpias and Falange de las JONS) as popular 
prosecutors (acusación popular) on the grounds that he had willingly 
misapplied the Amnesty Act (1977) when he decided to investigate the 
crimes and forced disappearances during and immediately after the Civil 
War and to exhumate or unearth some of the burials of victims. Judge 
Garzón claims to have interpreted Spanish legal norms in conformity with 
the norms on universal jurisdiction, “al amparo de tratados y normas 
internacionales de justicia universal” (El País, 19-05-2010). Garzón was 
again suspended from office by the Council on 19 April 2011, because the 
Supreme Court has opened judicial proceedings against him for having 
ordered the recording of conversations between the accused, in provisional 
detention, and their counsel in the Gürtel corruption case, something which, 
arguably, can only be lawfully ordered in cases of terrorism but which the 
Supreme Court itself has accepted in other ordinary crimes. The hearing 
took place between 16 and 19 January 2012 and the Court is to render 
judgment in the coming months. The Garzón case will be examined in detail 
below (part 7). 
(4) After seven years of judicial proceedings, the Audiencia Nacional, successor 
to the former francoist Tribunal de Orden Público, found the general editors, 
board of directors and managers of the Basque language newspaper 
Egunkaria “not guilty” of the criminal charges brought against them by AVT 
(Association of Victims of Terrorism) and Dignidad y Justicia, two other 
organisation close to the extreme right acting as “popular prosecution” 
(acusación popular, more on this below). They alleged that the board of 
directors of the newspaper were members of ETA and were using the 
                                                 
3 Pérez Royo (2010): “La expresión de la voluntad de autogobierno a través de la reforma del Estatuto 
era un problema estatuyente. La declaración de inconstitucionalidad de dicha expresión de voluntad nos 
sitúa ante un problema constituyente.” 
Joxerramon Bengoetxea  Seven Theses on Spanish Justice… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 9 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 5 
newspaper as an instrument of ETA. The newspaper had been closed down 
seven years ago by interim decision of Audiencia Nacional’s instructing judge 
Del Olmo (a colleague of Garzón’s) (ab)using exorbitant powers. The 
decision to shut down the paper was not in conformity with the Spanish 
Constitution, according to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 2010. 
Interestingly enough the case generated public outrage in Euskadi, but was 
largely ignored, if not applauded in the rest of Spain. It must also be 
recalled that Garzón himself had, in 1998, ordered the interim closure of 
Egin, another newspaper ideologically close to the radical Basque national 
left, for similar reasons to those later applied in Egunkaria and that some 
eight years later the Supreme Court declared there were no relevant links 
between the directors and ETA. It also decided that the interim decision to 
close the newspaper was a disproportionate infringement of the freedom of 
expression. These are just two of a long line of cases concerning Basque 
political expressions. One of the most recent and troubling cases has been 
the 10 year jail and incapacitation from office imposed on Arnaldo Otegi and 
Rafa Diez Usabiaga, leader and former Secretary General of the Batasuna 
movement and of the Trade Union LAB respectively, by judgement 22/11 of 
16-09-2011, of the Audiencia Nacional (4th Section presided by infamous 
judge Angela Murillo4) in case Bateragune, an attempt to organise a political 
party that would fulfil the conditions declared by the Constitutional Court 
and would thus be cleared of any structural link with ETA. The Supreme 
Court has declared that Otegi and Diez Usabiaga were actually following 
ETA’s instructions, and were therefore leading cadres of ETA, in setting up a 
party that would be finally independent from ETA. 
(5) Other examples of judicial abuses could be mentioned, e.g. concerning the 
relation of Spanish Courts with the European Court of Human Rights, who 
has on repeated occasions found that that Spain infringed the Convention in 
refusing to investigate allegations of torture, a breach of HR that had 
already been denounced by the United Nations rapporteur for Human Rights 
protection in the fight against terrorism, Martin Scheinin, but which Spain’s 
government had discarded on the ground of the rapporteur’s lack of 
knowledge of the situation on the ground in Spain. A recent example of 
abuse could be the Troitiño case5 and the so-called Parot doctrine of the 
Supreme Court in contrast with the Constitutional Court’s more guarantee 
oriented interpretation: the years spent in provisional detention can be 
counted towards the total sentence time, but can it be counted to reduce the 
time as converted into the maximum sentence to be served (maximum 30 
years) or is it to be deduced from the total computation of time after 
accumulation of all the declared crimes. This can add to several hundred 
                                                 
4 Judge Murillo had been removed or reccused from a different case involving Otegi when she had stated 
in Court that she already knew what Otegi was going to reply to one of her questions on evidence. 
However the reccusation in that other case, which on 22 July 2011 cleared Otegi of glorification of 
terrorism in the Sagarduy case, was not an obstacle to keeping her as presiding judge in the Bateragune 
case. In a previous case Otegi had been condemned to a two year prison sentence for the crime of 
injurias or disgraceful insult on the Spanish King (Article 490,3 of the Spanish Criminal Code). The 
Strasburg Court however decided on 15-03-2011 that Spain had infringed Otegi’s freedom of expression 
(case 2034/07, Otegi Mondragon v Spain). 
5 Troitiño served eight years under preventive custody, which added to the 24 years served under prison 
sentence for different crimes as ETA activist meant 32, full years, two extra years beyond the máximum 
penalty of 30 years according to the Criminal Code in force at the time he perpetrated his crimes. After 
the judgment of the Constitutional Court No 57/2008 was made public, the Criminal Chamber of the 
Audiencia Nacional decided to interpret that the double computation of preventive prison time was to be 
deducted from the total sum of prison years and not from the total or maximum penalty time of 30 
years. However the Supreme Court quashed this decision of the AN in February 2010 on the ground that 
this interpretation was punitive and went against the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. Finally Article 
58 of the Criminal Code was amended to the effect that time served on preventive prison is to be 
deducted only from the crime according to which it was decreed but not from different crimes for which 
the accused might be sentenced. This new legal limitation cannot be applied retroactively before that 
date. At any rate Troitiño served two extra years. 
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years, see the case Fernández de Larrrinoa and Lopez de Luzuriaga, 
accomplices, over 100 years, AN, 2nd Chamber refused to take preventive 
prison time into account, now TS orders them to do so but to deduce it from 
the total time resulting from the accumulation of sentences, this is seen as a 
clear message of authority – heteronomy - to the 3rd Chamber of Audiencia 
Nacional, who deduces the preventive detention time from the final 
applicable sentence as converted to real serving time, in line with the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation (judgment 57/2008). The Supreme 
Court has been fluctuating but leans towards its own Parot doctrine which 
amounts to virtual time. In any case authority over the Audiencia Nacional 
(or over one of its sections or chambers, given internal divergences) 
becomes a major issue of confrontation between the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court. 
Differences of opinion and interpretation between different courts, or chambers 
within the same court, are not new phenomena. What seems to be interesting is 
that these differences are to be seen as the result of interferences and 
interpellations to the judiciary made from different political actors, an underlying 
agreement between the governmental party and the opposition party, and also 
from most mass media calling for a more punitive and repressive approach. The 
media contributes in Spain to this image of the judiciary as abiding to political 
pressure or mobilizing it and eroding the principle of ultima ratio. A good example 
at hand is the overall reaction to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Bildu 
(May 2011) where this coalition has been allowed to stand in local elections. 
All these examples contribute to a general image of eroded legitimacy, disrepute, 
corporatism and political instrumentality of, at the very least, the higher instances 
of the judiciary in Spain: the Council, the Audiencia Nacional, the Supreme Court 
and, to a lesser degree, the Constitutional Court.  
2. Second thesis: Justice in Transition 
La transición española is a special type of transition based on three governing 
principles in the framework of a social contract of sorts: (1) amnesty for prisoners 
condemned of politically motivated crimes against the State, (2) amnesia, 
forgetfulness, and to some extent forgiveness, of the coup d’état and the excesses 
of the dictatorial Regime, and (3) a new constitutional order which was not 
discontinuous with the legal order of the dictatorship and where State officials – 
judges, police, military, diplomats, key administrators, law professors - were not 
removed from office. There was never a true “transitional justice”, no victim 
recognition, and therefore no elements of discovery of the past, no memory 
politics, truth commissions, reconciliation commissions… until 2008 when a Law on 
Historic Remembrance was finally passed. At most there was a “justice in 
transition” to constitutional rule of law and democratic principles. The Cortes that 
passed the Amnesty bill in 1977 were not intending to abolish the legality of the 
pre-constitutional order nor to restore republican legality. 
In Kelsenian terms, the prior legal system was transformed by its highest norm and 
Grundnorm. The continuity of the state was largely secured by the head of state, 
King Juan Carlos (Bourbon), who had been reinstated by the generalissimo as his 
successor as head of state (1973) and became King upon the death of Franco (Nov 
1975), and only later confirmed as constitutional monarch by referendum of the 
Constitution (Dec 1978). Let it be remembered, en passant, that judgments in 
Spain are still handed down in the name of the King, not in the name of the People, 
although Justice emanates from the people, according to Article 117(1) of the 
Constitution. 
The judiciary was left untouched and unreformed to apply and interpret the legal 
order now brought under the aegis of the new democratic Constitution, on the 
assumption that it would progressively adjust to the new ethos largely by the 
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technique of conform interpretation. This meant that all the norms of the Spanish 
legal system would be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution, and by 
application Article 10(2) of the Constitution, also in conformity with international 
Human Rights instruments, something almost revolutionary for the judges of the 
time. Judges would furthermore set aside and remove those norms which clearly 
and directly contradicted the Constitution or which could not be interpreted away. 
This was the assumption for the whole of the judiciary; some judges adjusted to 
the new ethos, others not so, but nothing was done about the latter (Rusiñol 2010). 
The technique of conforming or adapting a legal order to new constitutional 
principles was later transplanted by the most advanced judges into Community 
conform interpretation and it is not surprising that such principle of conform 
interpretation of EU law should have been forcefully elaborated by the European 
Court of Justice in a ruling on a preliminary reference from Spain, Marleasing, after 
the first formulation in von Colson and Calman.  
Serious doubts relating to the continuity of judicial institutions that had played a 
key repressive role in the dictatorship like the Audiencia Nacional were soon 
discarded; this special court was considered necessary for the centralised 
investigation of prosecution of terrorism and other forms of organised delinquency, 
for which it gives exceptional prerogatives. As a paradox, a case concerning street 
violence like burning a cash-desk, a garbage container or some forms of 
hooliganism in the Basque Country (including Navarre for this matter) could, if 
considered to be linked to terrorism, be tried before the Audiencia Nacional and 
receive much more severe sentence than if the same deed occurred in Madrid or in 
Caceres and was tried before the local courts of Madrid or Cáceres because it would 
be considered e.g. street violence. On the other hand a complaint that the police 
resorted to torture or degrading treatment in the course of the arrest and 
detentions of those accused of terrorism, would not be tried by the Audiencia 
Nacional but in the local courts. Margarita Robles, a member of the General Council 
of the Judiciary and former deputy minister in the Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministry, interestingly declared (16 June 2010, see press reports) that she believed 
it was time to abolish this “special” Court. 
Only a few changes were introduced in the Judiciary, notably: 
(1) the Constitutional Court, not strictly speaking part of the Judiciary but formally 
a distinct power, was created and on top of the classical constitutional review 
functions it was further entrusted with special fundamental rights’ protection 
mechanism (amparo). Awaiting new democratic laws and new judges, the 
Constitutional Court had a Herculean task. Accession to the European Convention of 
Human Rights and conform interpretation has largely secured uniformity of 
democratic and rule of law criteria over the legal system whenever the 
Constitutional Court has failed to detect important shortcomings, as was the case 
when Spain was found in breach of Article 6 of the Convention for its failure to 
provide a right to appeal in second instance in some jurisdictions like the Audiencia 
Nacional (incidentally also in the Supreme Court for cases of aforado accused like 
Garzón who has successfully (July 2011) reccused several of the judges of the 
Court that will hear his case because some of them had intervened in the pre-
examination of the case leading to the decision to open proceedings in the case 
concerning the Crimes Against Humanity);  
(2) the General Council of the Judicial Power was set up for the self-governance of 
the judiciary, thus protected from interference by the Administration, which was the 
normal state of affairs during the dictatorship; 
(3) a further interesting reform concerned the introduction of the jury, which is 
seen as facilitating popular participation in the administration of justice, together 
with the popular prosecution and other more traditional forms of lay or non-
professional justice like the justices of the peace (other forms like magistrates or 
professional boards and tribunals are not common in Spain). 
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3. Third thesis: Bifurcation and Duality of Justice 
There is a bifurcation, polarity or duality of Spanish Justice and its Judiciary. The 
larger majority of judges (jueces) in first or second posts together with some 
magistrados in higher judicial positions are now for their most part trained under 
the constitutional order and have followed the judicial school. Others have accessed 
as experienced jurists or law professors. Amongst the smaller number of judges 
(magistrados) involved in the highest posts some, those over 55, were trained 
under the pre-constitutional order but developed their careers under the 
constitutional system. A few older judges did the initial part of their careers under 
the Franco regime. But enough time has lapsed to consider there are no “pre-
constitutional” judges left at least from a biological point of view. Transition is over, 
normality is installed (Rusiñol 2010). 
The duality at the time of democratic transition was between existing judges 
(mostly male and over 45) and the judicial appointments made to the CC and 
highest jurisdictions to ensure interpretations in conformity with the constitution. 
With time, it was probably thought, the incoming judges, younger and progressively 
more gender balanced, the ones in closest contact with the citizens, would bring in 
their constitutional culture. The Judicial School has generally been instrumental in 
this process. However access to the judicial school is still done on the basis of a 
“perverse” system of study under semi-official mentors and a memory-based exam 
that does not seek to assess the “judicial virtues” of the candidates – e.g. 
neutrality, independence, impartiality, experience or common sense, competence, 
constitutional ethos, European Community and ECHR sensitivity. There is an 
awareness at the School that the system of training needs to change; see their 
programme for the 2010-2012 promotion, in order to acquire new skills on top of 
learning by heart. 
The legislative changes made to the General Council (1985) and the increasing 
bipolarity of Spanish politics since the mid-80s brought about a change in the 
previous dichotomy: instead of a consensus on key judicial appointments with 
democratic, Human Rights, rule of law outlooks, and judicial virtues there was a 
sort of party political power sharing concerning the Constitutional Court 
appointments and the highest appointments at the judiciary: parliamentary 
appointment by a 3/5 majority of 8 jurists and of 12 professional judges out of a 
total 21 Council members from a list of 36 judges proposed by the judicial 
associations - plus the appointments the Council makes to Supreme Court, the 
Audiencia Nacional, the Higher Courts of Justice of the Autonomous Communities. 
As an anecdote, former president Rodríguez Zapatero announced the appointment 
of the president of the judicial Council before he was had even been elected by the 
organ. The two larger parties had reached an agreement on a conservative judge, 
Divar, president of the Supreme Court and the Council. The 1985 reform of the 
method of nomination and selection to the Council have had a very negative impact 
on the image of Justice: unless the major parties act loyally and responsibly, the 
risk of abuse, horse-trading, “clientele”-orientation, corporatism and politicisation is 
enormous and embarrassing. 
One aspect of the bifurcation of judges is hierarchical. Whereas an elite judiciary 
enjoying lighter workload, better working conditions, clerks or legal assistants, 
higher salaries and prestige, is immersed or at least indirectly implicated in the 
party political and professional association struggle (corporatism), which in theory 
judges must not engage in, a majority are overworked (4000 judges producing 
some 1,6 million judgments in 2009), consider themselves to be under-paid and 
are not involved in power struggles. There are obviously exceptions in both 
categories. Most judges see themselves, following the Constitution, as a “Power” of 
the state and those in the elite positions see themselves as the holders of that 
power, not as a countervailing power; few see their role as primarily delivering a 
public service to the citizens and as ensuring the protection and guarantee of their 
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fundamental rights, a self-perception that would enhance the independence of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis the powers that be – formal and informal – which are the source 
of the challenges to citizens’ rights. The justice system – administration of justice -
seems to be focused more on justice operators rather than on citizens’ needs and 
more on the authoritative application of the law in a given case than on the 
effective resolution of disputes. 
This thesis of bifurcation or dichotomy splits in two further sub-theses: one 
concerns routine, ordinary justice where the attempts to modernise and 
professionalize is notable in a majority of the judiciary; the other theses concern 
the highest jurisdictions, and numerically exceptional and extraordinary cases, but 
much more visible and notorious and it concerns the politicisation and corporatism 
of (the higher) judiciary and the self-government of judges and its concomitant, the 
judicialisation of politics. The theoretical and methodological question is how to deal 
with this duality of Spanish Justice? We shall return to this question below. 
4. Fourth thesis: Modernisation of Justice 
Modernisation of Justice in Spain is progressing. Nowadays, the larger majority of 
the judiciary shares many symptoms with Southern European systems of justice - 
structure, age, gender, profession and vocation, career, case load, overwork, types 
of cases and specialisations, mass media misrepresentation generally and especially 
in cases of miscarriages of justice and corruption scandals, populist demands for 
retribution, again backed by the media, and criticism of guarantee-oriented judges, 
challenges to dispute resolution posed by a culturally and socially plural society, 
transnational business transactions and complexity in conflict of laws situations - 
and offers some interesting contrasts - relatively greater efficiency and 
productivity, special gender violence jurisdiction. 
Within Spain there are some regional differences in spite of the scant and scarce 
regional competences in the administration of justice. In some cases, like the 
Basque Country, these limited competences have been put to relatively good use 
where the issues were “neutral” like material resources – buildings and computers - 
but they have often been truncated or trimmed by an excessively centralistic 
interpretation by the Constitutional Court or the Council when the issues became 
more sensitive – promotion of the Basque language in the administration of justice 
or organisation of certain professional groups within the Administration of Justice 
later declared to be “national” (meaning Spanish) organs (“cuerpos nacionales”). 
Spanish Justice, contrary to popular opinion, is not so slow: an average case takes 
240 days in Spain compared to 420 days in France or 520 days in Italy. In the 
context of this process of modernisation, the new Judicial Office will be an added 
value for the processing of cases and maximising the time of the secretary and 
judge (again, Euskadi is a pioneer in the direction of Justice Quality protocols and 
the Judicial Office, as the paper by Izaskun Iriarte in this volume shows). Some 
judges have reacted in a corporatist fashion against these proposals but the 
majority welcomes the efforts in rationalisation. Obvious benefits will also follow for 
the other legal professions like lawyers and procurators. 
Other modernisation challenges like the number of judges per population (1 judge 
every 10 000 citizens, 4000 judges in 2008, 4800 in 2010, compared to an average 
of 2 judges per 10 000 inhabitants in the EU-27) or the budgetary efforts 
concerning justice, not only the salary of judges, have been important claims of the 
8th October movement of Spanish judges. By comparison with similar countries in 
the EU Spain’s larger part of the judiciary is quite modern, although much progress 
is still to be made6. 
                                                 
6 See the report of the Council for 2010 in English (Spain. General Council of the Judiciary 2010).  
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Because of this and other factors in the Spanish litigating culture, alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms have not really proliferated. Only recently in family 
and commercial disputes and, more timidly in minor criminal offences, is there any 
progress of ADR. Lawyers, of which there are comparatively many more than in 
similar EU countries like France or Italy, have also preferred judicial litigation over 
alternative solutions. There is a lot of litigation, approximately 6 million cases 
before the Courts in 2010 according to the report of the CGPJ for 20107. As the 
Council recognises, Alternative Dispute Resolution is still to be explored from the 
point of view of the Administration of Justice, the Legal Profession, the Law 
Schools, the many organisations involved in conflict resolution and management. 
Such a development would also take account of the new challenges posed by the 
modern plurality of normative claims related to social and cultural complexity, 
diversity and plurality (migrant populations, minorities). 
5. Fifth thesis: Politicisation of Justice 
Spanish Justice, as a self-governed Power, is still to demonstrate independence 
from the major political parties. Politicisation infects the Council to such an extent 
that 65% of the Spaniards, according to an opinion poll carried out by Metroscopia 
in 2010 believe that judges are under political party influence. The blame is largely 
on the two dominant political parties and their approach to justice, but the 
“appointed” judges have not had a clear view of their constitutional model or lived 
up to it. The attitude of the two dominant judicial associations or groupings, the 
conservative Asociación Profesional de la Magistratura (APM, the largest) and the 
progressive Jueces para la Democracia (JpD, the third largest) has not really 
helped; they seem to function as a cartel. Although the greatest number of judges 
are either non aligned or associated in the one association which is not politically 
salient, Francisco de Vitoria (FdV, the second largest), they have almost no 
representation amongst the highest judicial posts and one of possible explanations 
is that they have neither a clear political correlation nor a marked ideological 
affinity with any of the two largest political parties of Spain.  
Failure to renew the Constitutional Court, partial impeachment (recusación) of 
judges for certain cases for very remote reasons, and the fact that the media think 
they know exactly how each judge is going to vote or at least to lean, not simply 
because of the recurring and frequent, unpunished, leaks of privileged information, 
are all relevant symptoms. Renewal of the Council also took two long years for lack 
of political party agreement. The consequence of this public impression of horse-
trading in the key appointments is an erosion of the image of Justice. The Council 
formally complains whenever charges are made concerning its politicisation but it 
has done little to disprove those criticisms. The appointments it has made in the 
recent past have often lacked motivation (according to judgments of the Supreme 
Court itself). The Metroscopia poll found that only 11% of Spaniards believed 
judicial appointments were based on merit and 73% perceived such appointments 
as political or nepotistic. Merit is seen as coming only second to personal 
connections and corporatist affiliation. 
The Audiencia Nacional, again, is another worrying case, a remnant of the 
“transition”, as we have seen in thesis 2, its jurisdiction seems to counter the 
principle of local, natural, justice of proximity. Its powers of instruction and 
                                                 
7 “El Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) prevé que a finales de este año [2011] los tribunales 
acumularán 3.149.548 procedimientos en trámite (un 0,5% más que el pasado año), si bien habrán 
resuelto 9.459.548 millones de asuntos (2,7% más) y dictado 1.722.584 sentencias (lo que supone un 
aumento del 3,8%) … Por lo que se refiere a número de asuntos ingresados, también es la jurisdicción 
Penal la que podría acumular un mayor número al cierre de este año, con 6.687.137 asuntos, seguida de 
la Civil (1.972.170), la Social (432.174 ), la Contenciosa (292.675) y la Militar (233). …se espera que los 
tribunales españoles hayan resuelto a lo largo del presente año [2011] 6,7 millones en Penal, 2 millones 
de procedimientos civiles, 402.000 en la jurisdicción Social, 301.296 en la Contencioso-Administrativa y 
288 en la Militar.” El Mundo (2011). 
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investigation are enormous and this explains why some of its judges have acquired 
such media notoriety as Grande Marlaska or Garzón. This also explains Thesis 7. 
The executive is not free from these political excesses, and not only because the 
procurator general is functionally linked to the Government and doubts as to its 
impartiality and especially political neutrality and independence can be easily 
nourished. One major problem is when the executive resorts to the press to put 
pressure on some case or court before decision is made. The “administration of the 
Justice administration” is mostly a competence of the executive, and has been 
exercised with centralist zeal by the successive Spanish governments. This zeal 
goes even beyond the model of the Constitution, which, by far, falls short of being 
quasi-federal on this point: the decentralisation of the State has not been extended 
to the judiciary in the Spanish Constitution and the judicial power is modelled on a 
unitary state. The self-conception of the judiciary as a power, a unitary power, does 
not contribute to a more decentralised trend, against demands made by some 
Autonomous Communities. The judgment of the CC on the Catalan Council of the 
Judiciary in the new Estatut has made it clear that regional councils are 
unconstitutional, a staunch unionist conception of the Judiciary. 
6. Sixth thesis: the Judicialisation of Politics 
The interference of politics in the judicial power does not mean that the judiciary 
takes instructions from the political establishment (political parties, governments, 
leaders) as to how to decide their cases. Cases of corruption and bribery are rare. 
But a worrying symptom of the politicisation dynamics is where political parties 
take political disputes to the judicial arena and unfortunately this has been common 
practice in Spain, especially as regards the Constitutional Court, but also the 
Audiencia Nacional and the Supreme Court. If war was for von Clausewitz politics 
carried by other means, some judicial cases are political struggles carried out by 
other means. 
The Constitutional Court is in part designed precisely to resolve political disputes to 
the extent that the Constitution is thought to contain basic rules concerning 
fundamental rights, the minimum content of those rights and their balancing with 
other rights and prerogatives, the separation of powers, the prerogatives of the 
institutions and the distribution of competences. To the extent that a political party 
or an institution of the state might disagree fundamentally about laws adopted by a 
majority, constitutional review is indeed a means of controlling whether basic 
norms have been stretched too far. The action brought by the Popular Party against 
the new abortion law is an example at hand. It is a straightforward constitutional 
review of legislation. But when the Constitutional Court is systematically used in 
order to favour particular centralist interpretations that will be followed by a large 
majority in the Court (e.g. federal, subsidiarity disputes), where no member is 
elected to represent Autonomous Communities, the risk of abuse is obvious. The 
Catalan Estatut is an example. The Constitutional Court took seven attempts to find 
a consensus draft, with a block of 5-5. Another example was the proposal for a 
consultation approved by the Basque Parliament (Law 9/2008) declared 
unconstitutional in 11/9/2008 by a unanimous decision. In other legal cultures 
advocating comity and self-restraint in favour of the political arena it might seem 
odd to close political disputes by the highest Courts8. 
Besides the Constitutional Court, many judicial cases regarding Basque politics, not 
only those concerning the members of the terrorist group ETA (judgments in cases 
Henry Parot and De Juana Chaos have been very controversial) are further 
examples of judicializing politics. Organic law 6/2002 on political parties has led to 
the banning of the parties or electoral platforms linked to Batasuna, and thus, 
                                                 
8 See the contribution by Ditlev Tamm in this issue. By legal cultures, we understand a relatively stable 
pattern of legally oriented behaviour that derives from shared attitudes, social expectations and 
established ways of thinking in a society or in a given professional group (Nelken, 2006) 
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according to the courts, to the “ETA terrorist network” (Herri Batasuna, Euskal 
Herritarrok, the PCTV and ANV parties, and even more tellingly, Sortu, March 2011, 
with a 9 to 7 vote at the Supreme Court, judgment on amparo pending before the 
Constitutional Court. On a judgment of 5 May 2011 the Constitutional Court ruled, 
by six votes to five, that Bildu, a coalition of Basque national parties and 
independent candidates linked to the former Batasuna movement, could stand 
before local and provincial elections of May 2011). 
In 1998, the Egin newspaper was closed down. Next, the so-called 18/98 
prosecutions followed against a large number of organisations on both sides of the 
contours of the “socio-political” network supporting Batasuna and ETA. With the 
banning of Batasuna by the Supreme Court, the Basque Parliament was required to 
dissolve its correlative parliamentary group, something it had no power to do 
according to its own regulations, and in a truly Antigonan case9, the President of 
the Basque Parliament and two vice-presidents were prosecuted and ultimately 
condemned by the Supreme Court (impeachment from public office, 2007). The 
banning of Batasuna was ultimately found not to be in breach of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (30 June 2009) and the banning of ANV in December 
2010. But many offshoots of this process, the prohibition of most of the electoral 
platforms presented under different names by the same political movements (2002-
2009), was performed on the basis of detailed and capricious distinctions where 
some lists were allowed to contest and others were declared “polluted” by the 
presence of ETA supporters, based on the reports prepared by the police following 
vague, ambiguous or uncertain criteria that, in my contention, could ultimately be 
decided to be discriminatory and unfair by the Strasburg Court. 
The next episode in the saga continued when the President of the Basque 
Autonomous Community (Lehendakari Ibarretxe) and the leader of the Basque 
section of the PSOE and current Basque president) were prosecuted for having, 
separately, held political meetings and talks with leaders of the banned Batasuna 
party. They were finally acquitted, on different legal grounds, in both the Higher 
Court of Justice of the Basque Country (on procedural grounds) and the Supreme 
Court on appeal (on substantive grounds). But perhaps the political and public 
order situation in the Basque Country is exceptional and justifies exceptional 
measures and exceptional justice.  
This problem of the judicialization of politics was enhanced by the abuse that has 
been made of an institution which is peculiar, if not exclusive, to Spanish criminal 
procedure: the possibility to open a ‘popular prosecution’ when the public 
prosecution (semi-dependent on the Executive) is deciding not to prosecute or is 
prosecuting on some specific grounds. This can happen when there is a hidden 
plea-bargaining, or when the law is interpreted in a different way, or when the 
alleged facts are qualified differently, or when the public prosecutor is under 
executive instructions to refrain. But it can also be done for political motives, and 
the difficult question then is whether it is for the judges to discriminate according to 
the possible motivations of the popular prosecutors. There are a number of 
organisations in the Spanish nationalist right wing spectrum that can be considered 
“repeat players” or even “cause-lawyers” concerning political disputes with the 
Basque nationalists: Falange, Dignidad y Justicia (cases Jarrai-Haika-Segi, 18/98, 
Gestoras-Askatasuna, Batasuna-ANV-PCTV-Herriko Taberna, Egunkaria, Udalbiltza, 
Ibarretxe and Lopez, …), Manos Limpias (linked to the Spanish police and other civil 
servants groups and prosecutors in the Atutxa case or in previous failed attempts 
against Garzón), Foro de Ermua, AVT. The stated aim of many of these 
organisations is precisely to operate popular prosecutions in order to further their 
own “interpretation” of the rule of law and to persecute all persons and 
organisations that have any sort of link with what they call ETA terrorism 
understood in a way that expands well beyond its criminal activities and its activists 
                                                 
9 On Antigona’ predicament in the law see Etxabe (2011). 
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to embrace sympathisers or even by-standing cultural or social groups according to 
their thesis that “everything is ETA”, a thesis which was judicially developed and 
refined by judge Garzón himself. 
Although some of these cases concerning Basque politics seem absurd, they have 
not gained widespread international attention probably because they are seen as 
“exceptional” cases ultimately justified or explained away by the local and global 
fight against terrorism. But, as the next point shows, Basque exceptionalism does 
not explain everything that is odd in this extraordinary justice chapter. 
7. Seventh thesis: Paroxysm in the Garzón Case 
Paroxysm is a sudden recurrence of a disease. Most of the previous theses 
converge in Judge Garzón’s prosecution, a legal theoretical, constitutional, penal, 
criminological and even procedural test case. Popular movements and protests 
have been organised, campaigns have been launched, opinions and articles 
published by the thousands by jurists in Spain (some having held key positions like 
former Anti-corruption Prosecutor Jiménez Villarejo who considered the prosecution 
as a “deadly blow to democracy”) and Worldwide. Garzón has been part of the 
judicial elite for the last twenty years, in charge of the Juzgado Central nº 5 of the 
Audiencia Nacional. The exorbitant powers of its instructing judges have already 
been mentioned. It is interesting to add, however, that these powers were 
sometimes unscrupulously used with little concern for the consequences or for the 
types of rights involved – fundamental rights are involved in the closure of 
newspapers or in the banning of political parties or prosecution of NGOs like in the 
18/98 proceedings - and with scant consideration for the actions and prosecutions 
that were being heard simultaneously at other courts. Two examples can be 
mentioned. Garzon suspended all functions and activities and froze the accounts of 
Batasuna and later ANV while the case was still being heard by the Supreme Court 
Criminal Chamber. Some excesses in his instruction zeal also led to the release of 
suspects that had high risk of evasion in some notorious drug trafficking cases. 
Judge Baltasar Garzón now falls from “starlet” judge, Nobel peace prize nominee, a 
quixotic character determined to fight dictators like Pinochet, to fight ETA or Al 
Quaida terrorists or para-state involvement in counter-terrorist commandos like the 
GAL, and to transform International Human Rights Law, to the position of a 
seeming victim of an obscure plot, provisionally discharged from his functions by 
the Council (CGPJ in mid-May 2010 following the opening of the hearings in the 
Franco’s regime Crimes Against Humanity and 19 April 2011 following the opening 
of proceedings by the SC on the Gurtel case) pending the decision on his case by 
the Supreme Court (this disciplinary discharge measure by the Council is automatic 
once the prosecution case has been opened). He was “rescued” internationally to 
become attaché to Moreno Ocampo, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
on special leave of 7 months granted by the CGPJ. The charge before the Supreme 
Court is prevarication i.e. to have knowingly and intentionally adopted an unjust 
judicial decision (Article 446, 3 of the Penal Code), in this case to have declared 
universal and retroactive jurisdiction and misapplied the Amnesty law of 1977, by 
investigating some crimes against Humanity committed by the rebels who led the 
coup d’état against the Republic, against the form of government and highest 
organs of the state, and the forceful disappearances and actually imputing them to 
actors known to be dead, considering these to be crimes against Humanity which 
do not prescribe and cannot be condoned by the Amnesty law. Garzón later, soon 
after assuming jurisdiction, declined jurisdiction in favour of the Courts located in 
the judicial districts where the mass “graves” were located. 
Two other charges against Garzón are one of corruption, in that he received sums 
of money from Santander banker Emilio Botín for the organisation of some courses 
about terrorism in New York and incidentally adopted a decision that cleared some 
executives of Santander, and, perhaps the most dangerous of his moves, another 
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charge of prevarication in that he is said to have breached the law by authorising 
recordings of lawyers’ conversations with their imprisoned clients in the famous 
Gürtel case (Gürtel is the code name given by police detectives to the corruption 
cases involving the Popular Party (at national level, and especially in Valencia10) 
with businessman Mr Correa11. It involves millions of euros. 
One possible reaction to the Garzón case would be to dismiss its importance by 
assuming that the Supreme Court will not let itself be led to such an absurd 
situation. But one cannot forget the constitutional crisis that this Supreme Court 
brought about in 2004 (judgment 51/2004 of 23 January) by declaring that eleven 
of the twelve judges of the Constitutional Court were liable for negligence in their 
“absolutely unlawful conduct” and were ordered to pay 500€ each to the plaintiff 
who had attempted to obtain a declaration suspending a call for nominees to be 
appointed as legal clerks to the Constitutional Court without a public exam. This 
action was declared inadmissible by the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme 
Court, and then refused by the Constitutional Court on amparo because the plaintiff 
pretended that the Constitutional Court should remove itself from the case and 
create a special ad hoc court to examine the amparo. This absurd situation had 
been considered as a sort of judicial coup d’Etat by Rubio Llorente (president of the 
Consejo de Estado, Rubio LLorente: 2004) 
Of the three, the charges that have aroused international awe is that concerning his 
willing violation (mens rea) of the Amnesty law. These charges will be examined in 
relation to the autonomy and heteronomy of the Judiciary: (1) who is prosecuting 
Garzón and why; (2) how does the issue of conform interpretation become relevant 
and (3) what are the consequences or implications for Justice of confusing a judicial 
error or mistake and a judicial offence prevarication following from an unjust 
decision? 
(1) Procedurally, Judge Garzón is being prosecuted on the basis of the 
institution of the popular prosecution brought, initially, by two associations 
that are ideologically close to the alleged perpetrators of the crimes he 
intended to investigate, in the extreme Spanish nationalist right wing. There 
has been some debate as to whether such prosecution can proceed in the 
absence of a victim’s prosecution or public prosecution. There are two 
Supreme Court judgements in different directions: the Botin case, after the 
aforementioned president of Santander bank, excluding the possibility of a 
prosecution based exclusively on popular accusation, and the Atutxa case 
allowing prosecution in the absence of other victim or state prosecution, a 
precedent provisionally settled with the Ibarretxe case in favour of allowing 
the prosecution based on only popular accusation. Garzón’s prosecution was 
heard and initially accepted by judge Varela, a former colleague of Garzón at 
the Spanish Government, another of the elite, competent judges linked to 
the progressive judicial association Jueces para la Democracia. Judge Garzón 
tried, unsuccessfully, to impeach Judge Varela in the current case because 
he had instructed the popular prosecutions in this case on the proper way to 
present charges based on facts rather than on ideological assumptions. In 
other words, Varela had assisted the prosecution. The Falange has actually 
been removed for failure to substantiate this formal impediment of basing 
the prosecution on ideological grounds. 
In the instruction phase, Garzón’s defence lawyer called for expert witnesses 
– prestigious international criminal jurists - to declare on universal 
jurisdiction and on the issue whether the alleged crimes Garzón intended to 
investigate might have prescribed or whether Amnesty laws can extend as 
far as condoning such crimes and violations of Human Rights. Animosity 
                                                 
10 Francisco Camps, former president of the Valencia Autonomous Community, is being prosecuted for 
corruption (technically delito continuado de cohecho). 
11 “Gürtel” in German or “belt” in English is a possible translation of the Spanish word and name correa, 
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between the judges or generally against Garzón is not, formally, a relevant 
factor, but it could perhaps explain some of the reactions from the right-
wing and the sympathetic reactions from more progressive circles, in a spiral 
widely reinforced by the right-wing press. One plausible reason to prosecute 
the judge lies in his attempt to prosecute perpetrators who are known to be 
dead, which is an absolute procedural impediment. How can a judge actually 
prosecute someone who is clearly dead, or how can he prosecute a whole 
regime? But the investigation could have focused on the prior identification 
of the victims instead of the perpetrators. At any rate, if any mistake had 
been made in this sense, it was soon corrected by Garzón himself, for he 
soon, in a rather erratic move, declined jurisdiction in favour of the local 
“natural” courts where the bodies were to be unearthed. 
(2) Conform interpretation is an important issue for any legal system which is 
seen as linked with other legal systems under the umbrella of a higher or 
superior law. Such would be the case for International Human Rights law. 
According to the Spanish Constitution (Art 10, 2) Spanish law is to be 
interpreted in conformity with such instruments. There have been previous 
attempts to explore the notion of universal jurisdiction under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and general principles of 
international Human Rights law, and Garzón has pushed in that direction, 
but the Supreme Court decided that jurisdiction could only be claimed where 
there was a point of connection – victim, perpetrators, locus - with Spain. 
The main point of conform interpretation is to develop a flexible concept of 
interpretation of domestic law and to abide by (interpretation of) higher law, 
thereby setting aside, if necessary, domestic conceptions which might 
impede the realisation of the goals, concepts and purposes (the telos) of the 
higher law. It implies a challenge to sovereignty of the domestic judicial 
hierarchy if necessary, a switch of loyalties from the domestic sovereign to 
the international or supranational sovereign and therefore an exercise of 
Kantian autonomy on the part of the judge, in order to accept higher law; a 
fine balance between autonomy and heteronomy. Judge Garzón has often 
placed himself in that predicament, disdainful of the possible implications of 
such exercises in autonomy, and might have upset judicial colleagues and 
superiors as well as Governments and diplomats. On the other hand, if the 
debate bears on the possibility of prosecuting persons who are notoriously 
dead, it might be a matter of interpretation to what extent this is at all 
possible under Spanish criminal law. If it is clearly against the law to do so, 
judge Garzón was either “prevaricating” or he was trying to achieve a 
different, arguably legitimate, aim, possibly to accelerate an investigation 
that would have otherwise taken a longer and more complex procedure 
under the Law on Historic Remembrance, an Act that his critics claim he 
could have used alternatively. 
(3) The charge against Garzón is very serious: knowingly adopting an unjust 
decision to investigate. But unjust toward whom exactly? In a context where 
no individual victim of his proceedings can be identified (but only a general 
unidentified victim of his injustice, one wonders how the popular prosecution 
might be affected by the alleged misapplication of the law. What exactly is 
the protected good? Prevarication goes well beyond a judicial mistake, which 
could be appealed against and eventually corrected by the jurisdictional 
system – appeals, cassation, revision - on the argument of hierarchy or 
authority. The charge of prevarication implies wrongness - the decision has 
to be wrong – but it implies the knowledge of its wrongness and therefore 
the will to inflict or commit an injustice by making and applying such 
decision. I shall not discuss, whether there is indeed material wrongness in 
the instructor’s decision to investigate – the main question then switches 
from investigating what to investigating whom - or whether the Amnesty law 
has to be interpreted in conformity with international human rights law to 
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the effect that the crimes in question have not prescribed, that there are 
real victims and they might have a right to know. This seems to be the 
playing field towards which Judge Garzón’s many supporters want to move 
the debate. The question whether the norms concerning crimes against 
Humanity were created in the Nurnberg trials or discovered as previously 
and universally valid a-temporal laws is difficult but the opening of the 
hearing by Judge Varela seems to imply that there is indeed wrongness, for 
if Garzón’s decision to investigate had been right it could not possibly have 
involved prevarication and the popular prosecution would have been thrown 
out lacking in fumus boni iuris. 
Assuming Garzón’s decision to investigate was right, i.e. that prosecuting 
known or unknown perpetrators who are presumably dead is the only way to 
initiate investigations to find victims; assuming Garzón accepted jurisdiction 
and started to investigate simply because the charges were initially brought 
by “victims”’ relatives; assuming there is at least a reasonable doubt as to 
whether international human rights law would allow an Amnesty law that 
actually condoned crimes against Humanity; and finally assuming that the 
facts to be discovered attributed to those involved in the forceful 
disappearances were to be qualified as “crimes against Humanity”, then the 
decision of judge Varela to accept the prosecution of Garzón could itself also 
be an unjust decision knowingly misapplying the law and subject to the 
crime of prevarication. Varela must have known there was at least a 
reasonable doubt of the justness of his decision. We could fold back in 
circles. Would we know where to stop? In March 2011, judge Garzón has 
brought a case against Spain before the Strasburg Court. Opening criminal 
procedures against him for having performed his judicial function is indeed a 
violation of Article 6 of the Convention; but are domestic remedies 
exhausted? Garzón now argues that it is the very fact of opening 
proceedings against him and refusing to accept the witnesses and experts 
that he had proposed on the issue of Universal Jurisdiction that constitutes a 
violation of his right to a fair trial. 
Accepting to hear the prosecution under such charges has been a huge mistake in 
legal theory and interpretation and in judicial strategy and has done immense harm 
to the image of justice in Spain. Is the system being abused to carry a quarrel 
between judicial colleagues through other means or is it actually being used to 
protect the reputation of justice at the verge of incurring in the absurd? Or, is it 
really because Garzón started to investigate the Gürtel case that he has been 
stopped by judges close to the PP? Indeed, the case on Universal Jurisdiction and 
crimes against humanity was suspended pending Garzón’s recusation of some of 
the Supreme Court judges who were to judge him but who had also decided to 
open the hearing. There was a breach of impartiality because the judges have been 
instructing judges12. The Supreme Court has accepted the recusation and five 
judges who had taken part in the investigation phase will not be able to judge him 
now (Lázaro 2011). 
The Gürtel case is also moving on, in fact much faster, and Garzón’s decision to 
record the conversations is the subject of his prosecution before the Supreme Court 
and suspension by the Council. Two of the judges involved in the Chamber of the 
Supreme Court that will judge Garzón in the Gürtel case have been recused by 
Garzón, along with five other judges, one of them is Judge Varela, now at the 
Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have rejected 
the recusation so judge Varela will be allowed to decide on the case (Yoldi 2012)13. 
The recusation has been admitted for five other judges though. On the exhumation 
                                                 
12 See to this effect the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 26 October 2010 declaring 
that Spain has breached Art 6 for a similar situation. 
13 In the meantime, the Gürtel case as such is being investigated by the Madrid courts. 
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of victims of Franquism case where there is enormous international attention, Judge 
Varela believed prosecuting Garzón was necessary in order to prevent the absurdity 
of prosecuting dead people. But the Supreme and Constitutional courts have 
decided that the two cases, the hearings in Gürtel and the exhumations are 
unrelated and that whatever expressions Varela might have uttered personally 
against Garzón are not sufficient to remove him from the case. For those who 
support Garzón the absurdity lies in a situation where you accept criminal 
prosecutions against a judge simply because you do not like what he is doing or 
think he is mistaken and acting ultra vires. If Garzón is found guilty in this 
exhumation case, the shadow of a doubt as to his proper, adequate performance of 
judicial functions in many other cases applauded by the current prosecutors and by 
Spanish society at large (the ETA and Batasuna cases) would be hard to dissipate. 
But if Garzón is found guilty on the Gürtel hearings case, he would lose his 
condition as a judge and the case against him under the exhumation decisions 
might be herd by ordinary courts. This seems to be one reason why the Supreme 
Court wants to speed up the Gürtel case, which was lodged considerably later in 
time. In my view paroxyms is the proper term because there is a background 
sociological problem with Justice in Spain, which is largely the thesis in this paper, 
and the Garzón case brings out many things that are rotten in the Kingdom, 
possibly linked to the way the transition was handled with no genuine transitional 
justice. 
8. Conclusion 
Whereas Spanish Justice shares many features with other Southern European 
countries14 there are certain traits that make it a very special case. In spite of its 
efforts at modernisation and the quality of most judges, Spanish Justice is in 
disrepute due to the politicised practices of the General Council, carried to the 
highest judicial appointments (including the Constitutional Court) and due to the 
judicialization of politics, and perhaps also because of the direct link of the 
procurator with the Government (it is the way this link operates and its 
consequences on independence rather than the fact that there is an organic link). 
These features make the Spanish case clearly distinguishable from the Italian case, 
for example, where corruption is a more widely extended phenomenon. In the case 
of judge Garzón this disrepute has led to paroxysm of absurdity. This exceptionality 
of these situations might perhaps be related to explanations of political and 
sociological theory rather than legalistic explanations or even legal theoretical ones. 
The absence of a transitional justice in Spain is perhaps an important explanation of 
the new spheres or spectres of exception, which can be explained on the basis of 
judicialisation of (Basque and Catalan) politics and politicisation of justice and 
justices, and which are re-surfacing in the ongoing and intricate Garzón cases. 
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